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Abstract 
Theories of economic globalization suggest that public opinion-public policy congruence 
should be affected by states’ degree of integration with international markets. With as much 
attention researchers have given to the opinion-policy linkage in the American states, it is 
surprising that this literature has neglected these well-known globalization frameworks. We take 
advantage of the wide variation in US states’ integration in global markets, public policies, and 
political orientations of citizens, to assess whether global market integration depresses the 
association between citizen opinion and public policies. Using three decades of state-level data, 
our results suggest that high global market integration does not attenuate the relationship 
between state opinion and state public spending.  Not only does this finding run counter to the 
well-known policy convergence thesis, but our results also suggest that the association between 
opinion and policy in the American states may be strongest under conditions of high global 
market integration.  
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Because many theories assert that the quality of government, especially democracies, can 
in part be assessed by whether public policies mirror the public preferences, political scientists 
have long sought to assess the relationship between public opinion and public policy (Erikson, et 
al. 1993.; Dahl 1989). A positive link between opinion and policy has been demonstrated across 
enough diverse domains that it is even referred to as ‘conventional wisdom’ within parts of the 
discipline (see Burstein 2003, 29).2 Although the dominant view suggests a substantial opinion-
policy linkage, a group of mostly recent studies offer important critical or qualifying arguments.   
Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) note that elite manipulation of public opinion, rather than 
responsiveness, may help explain much of the opinion-policy linkage.  Others argue that many of 
the traditional approaches to assess opinion-policy congruence may mask the true relationship 
between public opinion and policy (Bartels 2008; Gilens and Page 2014). A growing number of 
scholars largely accept that a connection exists, but seek to identify factors that enhance or 
attenuate the strength of the opinion-policy linkage (Monroe 1998; Monogan 2013; Lax and 
Phillips 2012; Radcliff and Saiz 1995; Krueger and Mueller 2001; Jacobs and Page 2005; Gilens 
2005; Flavin 2012). Overall this literature points to the need for further consideration of when 
and how opinion and policy are connected. 
With as much attention the U.S. opinion-policy linkage has received in general over the 
past few decades and with the search for qualifiers enriching this debate recently, it is surprising 
that the literature has neglected to consider theories of economic globalization.  Two of the most 
prominent theoretical frameworks for understanding economic globalization provide a central 
position for democratic responsiveness, and hence the opinion-policy connection.  Additionally, 
much of the framing of economic globalization in the news media centers on governments 
disregarding their citizen’s wishes in favor of global bond markets and international corporations. 
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Just recently, the Greek government ignored a one-week-old citizen referendum and accepted the 
European Union’s austerity demands and the U.S. negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade 
agreement in secret --without any citizen input to reject.  The New York Times chronicled 
widespread cutting of “public services” across the American states due to revenue shortfalls 
caused in part by concessions made to global corporations; many U.S. state “officials said they 
feared that companies would move jobs overseas” if billions of dollars in special tax treatment 
ended (Story 2012).    
The opinion-policy literature’s past inattention to economic globalization is somewhat 
understandable. Decades ago, when the iconic studies that built the foundation of the opinion-
policy congruence literature emerged, the U.S. had among the lowest exposure to global trade as 
percentage of GDP compared to other OECD countries.   But understanding the U.S. as a 
globalization outlier no longer applies, as the United States has tripled its reliance on 
international trade as a percentage of GDP from 1977 to 2010 (see Owen and Quinn 2014).  
Additionally, the diversity at the U.S. state level has long been used to examine the opinion-
policy congruence and offers a fruitful place to examine the implications of economic 
globalization on the opinion-policy connection because state economies have varying degrees of 
integration with the global marketplace.3  
In this paper, we offer an initial test of whether the degree of American states' global 
market integration moderates the relationship between citizen opinion and government spending 
from 1987 to 2006. A study incorporating globalization theories not only enhances our 
understanding of the potential moderators of the opinion-policy linkage, but also provides a new 
domain to test competing views of economic globalization. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. In the next section, we discuss the policy convergence and room to maneuver theoretical 
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frameworks and connect these competing theories to expectations about the opinion-policy linkage 
in the American states. Then we introduce our data and methods and present the major findings. 
Using three decades of state-level data, our results suggest that high global market integration does 
not attenuate the relationship between state opinion and state public spending, which runs counter 
to the well-known policy convergence thesis. Finally we offer a discussion of the implications of 
our results and suggest some limitations of these initial findings. 
Policy Convergence Theory 
Policy convergence theory ranks as the most widely recognized theory regarding the 
relationship between economic globalization and public policy (Mosley 2005).  Convergence 
theory argues that high levels of integration with global markets encourage public policies that 
conform to corporate preferences and eventually converge.  Capital mobility and competition 
between states to attract and retain this capital underpin the convergence logic.  Mobile firms in 
the global market become increasingly averse to residing in regions that sustain large public 
sectors, which are seen to decrease work incentives, increase the costs of business operations, 
and ultimately reduce profit (Garrett 1998).  In a highly globalized environment where capital 
and firms can relocate their business to the most favorable locale relatively easily, states are 
pressured to structure state spending in order to provide a low cost environment for 
corporations.4  As a result, under the pressure of “capital flight” with globalization, state policy 
will converge, as states race-to-the-bottom in public spending.   
From this perspective, the needs of corporations in the global market dominate state 
spending policies. States that are highly integrated with the global market and wish to take an 
alternative policy track cannot do so without suffering negative economic consequences.  As 
Waltz reminds us, “states can defy the ‘herd,’ but they will pay a price, usually a steep one,” as 
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high spending states will encourage capital flight (Waltz 1999, 694).  Because elected officials 
have difficulty remaining in power with economic downturns such as job losses or wage declines, 
states, regardless of their ideological proclivities, are predicted to converge at a low public 
spending bottom under pressures of economic globalization.  
Garrett suggests that for convergence theory, “political autonomy, if not de jure 
sovereignty, is considered the primary ‘casualty’ of globalization” (Garrett 1998, 788, see also 
Agné 2011; Habermas 1999; Dahl 1989; Held 1995).  And although state political autonomy 
alone may not be sufficient for a strong connection between citizens’ opinions and public policy, 
it is a necessary condition (Agné 2011).  Because the needs of the global market dominate 
policymaking, and citizens’ views become relatively less important, the citizen opinion-public 
policy connection should be attenuated.5  As Piven notes about globalization in the American 
states, “[c]itizenship loses much of its meaning if governments cannot act on matters crucial to 
the economic well-being of ordinary people.  In this sense, democratic rights are rolled back” 
(Piven 2001, 28). 
Room to Maneuver 
Policy convergence theory ranks as the best known framework for understanding how 
capital mobility affects states’ ability to make policy choices reflecting public opinion.   The 
room to maneuver approach is often seen as its chief theoretical rival.  In short, the room to 
maneuver hypothesis suggests that, “political reactions to globalization are not entirely 
preprogrammed by globalization itself but also depend on domestic structures” (Genschel 2004, 
632; see also Mosley 2005, 355).  Indeed, the earliest work in this area by Cameron (1978) and 
Katzenstein (1985) shows that  instead of globalization leading to a race to the bottom, it instead 
often triggers greater public spending because citizens increase their demands for governmental 
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compensation and protections against the risks and anxieties associated with increased global 
market integration (Agné 2011).   
Geoffrey Garrett, one of the best known empirical researchers in this area, shows through 
his analysis of advanced democracies that the “benefits of globalization can be reaped without 
undermining the economic sovereignty of nations, and without reducing the ability of citizens to 
choose how to distribute benefits – and the costs – of the market” (Garrett 1998, 6).  Importantly, 
in the mostly European nations that are analyzed by Garrett, increased economic globalization 
typically amplifies the demands of citizens that want increased public social services and 
protections.  For Garrett, economic globalization enhances the “political logic of voice,” from the 
people in the area of social protections by “strengthened political incentives for governments to 
use the policy instruments of the state to mitigate dislocations by redistributing wealth and risk” 
(Garrett 1998, 789-791). 
In part because the room to maneuver hypothesis is known to diverge sharply with 
convergence theory, and because social democratic parties in Europe have been a core focus of 
empirical research, room to maneuver is often associated with increases in social spending.  But 
a close reading of the theory suggests that room to maneuver is more accurately described as 
states having the ability to use a variety of tools and policies to respond to the challenges 
associated with economic globalization. Policy option is key. Garrett is certainly aware that 
states can maneuver in various ways, “social democratic/left parties respond to globalization 
differently than center right and right parties” (Garrett 1995, 658; see also Burgoon 2001; Agné 
2011).  Conservatives often argue that in the face of increased economic global competition, 
making the state environment the most attractive to capital by cutting public spending offers the 
best chance for corporations and citizens alike to prosper.  In other words, rather than growing 
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the public sector to provide more social welfare benefits and other government services, 
conservatives want “supply side oriented economic policies that emphasize growth and 
employment” that will retain globally mobile capital in the state and by extension keep the 
unemployment rate low, obviating much of the need for public services (Swank 2005, 188).   
This logic may be particularly efficacious in the U.S. context because welfare state 
legitimacy is lowest in Anglo-Liberal democracies and the U.S. in particular (Brooks and Manza 
2006b; Brooks and Manza 2006a).  In the U.S. small government arguments are more accepted 
generally, and economic globalization, with its threat of capital exit, provides a structural context 
that may strengthen the logic of existing conservative desires for the nature of public spending 
(Piven 2001). In other words, when exposed to global market competition, conservative 
citizenries will use the global market logic to push for reductions in public expenditures to attract 
and retain capital, with the hopes that this will bring a robust economy and high wage jobs.  
Altogether, the room to maneuver hypothesis suggest that economic globalization should 
not sever the link between citizen opinion and policy.  Although liberals and conservatives will 
approach solving the challenges associated with economic globalization differently, citizens in 
states that have globally integrated economies will demand that states conform to their view of 
how public policies should deal with the global marketplace.  When highly exposed to global 
market pressures, states with liberal populations will demand a robust public sector to 
compensate for the vagaries and anxiety associated with economic globalization. Conservative 
citizens in highly globalized states will use the threat of capital flight and global competition to 
press for efficiency in the form of low public spending. Critically, room to maneuver not only 
suggests that liberal and conservative citizens will demand different policy outcomes, but that 
states will have the ability to match their public policies to various citizen preferences.   
9 
 
Hypotheses 
The two theoretical frameworks suggest different implications for the citizen opinion-
public policy connection in the U.S. states.  In situations where public opinion generally 
influences public policy, we would expect the following empirical implications of the theories 
presented above: 
Convergence Hypothesis 
The relationship between state citizen ideology and state public policies should be weaker 
in states with high global trade compared to states with low global trade. 
Room to Maneuver Hypothesis 
The relationship between state citizen ideology and state public policies should not be 
weaker in states with high global trade compared to states with low global trade. 
If the marginal effect of state citizen ideology on public policy is weaker in highly 
globalized states compared to lowly globalized states, then the evidence would support the 
convergence hypothesis.  If the marginal effect of state citizen ideology on public policy is not 
statistically different (null) or stronger in highly globalized states compared to low globalized 
states, then the evidence would support the room to maneuver hypothesis.6  Although cross-
national empirical studies of globalization and public policy often evaluate the independent 
connection between global trade and public policy, the global trade public policy linkage is not 
key to evaluating our hypotheses; we are focused instead on whether high levels of global trade 
attenuates the citizen opinion-policy connection.  Throughout the manuscript, when considering 
10 
 
the hypotheses, we will compare the independent relationship between citizen opinion and public 
policy when states have low versus high levels of global trade.   
 
Data and Methods 
We utilize pooled cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) data from 1987 to 2006 to assess 
the applicability of these competing frameworks for understanding how the degree of global 
market integration influences the linkage between public opinion and public spending in the 
American states. Broadly considered, we estimate overall state government spending and state 
government spending on welfare as a function of state citizen opinion liberalism and its 
interaction with two distinct, but overlapping, measures of economic globalization at the state 
level: trade dependence and trade exposure (detailed below). These interactions test for any 
conditional effect that economic globalization may have on the public opinion-public spending 
linkage. This approach follows Monogan, Gray, and Lowery’s (2009, 306) technique for 
assessing whether the “effect of opinion liberalism on policy liberalism differs between initiative 
and noninitiative states,” except that we consider how state level global market integration 
conditions the association between opinion and policy. We use a fixed effects estimator with 
robust standard errors that includes both state and year fixed effects. We estimate the following 
equation of per capita state expenditures, 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑒.𝑖𝑖  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑔𝑠 × 𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒)𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑖        (1) 
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where opinion is a state i’s citizen opinion liberalism in year t. Globe is a state’s degree of global 
market integration, and globe x opinion is their interaction. Control is a vector of relevant control 
variables, α is the state fixed effects, δ is the year fixed effects, and μ is the error term. The 
control variables are included to account for macro conditions that influence a state’s 1) ability to 
spend money (i.e. per capita income) and 2) the demand for public spending (i.e. unemployment 
rate).  After we control for states’ ability to spend on programs as well as the states’ demand for 
program spending, we expect that citizens’ political opinion should help predict the remaining 
variance in the amount of state spending, with liberal states spending more and conservative 
states spending less.  In other words, assessing the public opinion - state spending connection 
only serves as a measure of congruence when the key macro level factors have been held 
constant.  Below we detail the two expenditure measures used as dependent variables, as well as 
the relevant independent variables. 
Considering that little consensus exists about the best way to handle cross-sectional time-
series data (Greene 2011; Baltagi, et al. 2003), we also ran a set of dynamic error correction 
models (ECMs) as an alternative to our fixed effect models following Banerjee, et al. (1993), De 
Boef (2001) and De Boef and Keele’s (2008). Details of the ECM modeling strategy, as well as 
the results are presented in Appendix 2. The results from the two modeling approaches are 
broadly consistent and suggest that while facing higher levels of globalization, the independent 
relationship between mass liberalism and public spending in the American states is not 
attenuated. Table 1 and the discussion that follows present the measurements and data sources of 
the variables in detail.   
Dependent Variables  
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We use as our dependent variables two different categories of per capita government 
spending – overall state public expenditure and expenditures on welfare. Data on these measures 
are collected from State and Local Government Finance of the Census Bureau. The typical state 
averages approximately $3,500 in total expenditures per person in the population and just over 
$700 in per capita welfare expenditures, with each of these distributions approaching normal. We 
use per capita spending to distinguish between states of varying populations and to facilitate 
interpretation of the results. 7   
 
Core Independent Variables 
State Citizen Opinion Liberalism 
Because it offers a long time series and relies on citizens, rather than elite proxies, we use 
a voter liberalism score created by Pacheco (2011) as the measure of state voter ideology. This 
measure is derived from state exit polls using Multilevel Regression with Post-stratification 
(MRP) and represents the collective general ideological orientation of state voters.  The score 
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a more liberal electorate.  Overtime measures 
of specific policy opinion are not available; fortunately, general political ideology by far best 
predicts state level social spending, compared to all other policy outputs (Brace, et al. 2002, 
183).8   
 
Global Market Integration: Trade Dependence and Exposure 
Because “increasing trade competition is the first component of the conventional 
globalization thesis” we use two distinct, but overlapping, measures to capture different aspects 
of global market integration (Garrett 1998, 792). The first measure is state exports as a 
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percentage of Gross State Product (GSP). We refer to this measure as trade dependence and 
believe it to best capture the relative size of a state’s exporting economy. This variable mirrors 
trade measures that are commonly used in cross-national studies. Krugman (2008) refers to it as 
a measure of how crucial trade is to an economy and also as a measure of trade importance or 
trade reliance. Economies with larger shares of state incomes derived from international exports 
are more trade dependent. Data on state-level exportation data are collected from the Foreign 
Trade Division of the Department of Commerce in the Census. We would have preferred using 
total trade (imports plus exports as a percentage of GSP) as our measure, to be consistent with 
the cross-national studies, but state level importation data are not available for the time series.  
Even so, the correlations between U.S. national-level export and total trade from 1960-2012 are 
over 0.9, which suggests that our state-level export measure is highly correlated with the state-
level total trade measure.  
Economic globalization is a complex process, and what a state exports matters for 
economic performance and how individuals experience international trade (Hausmann, et al. 
2007).  We therefore construct a second measure of global market integration, trade exposure, to 
better capture the positioning of a state’s exporting economy.  Trade exposure is an index of 
states’ comparative advantage/disadvantage in particular industries weighted by an industry’s 
position on the U.S. net exports – net import spectrum. Appendix 1 describes the construction of 
the trade exposure index. 
The trade exposure index has several favorable qualities. First, it exploits industry-level 
data in order to identify a state’s comparative advantage in a particular industry. In this analysis 
we use state data on the relative sizes of three industries: services, agriculture, and manufacturing. 
Second, it also uses U.S. export and import data, which easily go back to the 1980s and are much 
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more available than state-level data. This feature allows us to exploit state variation in alignment 
with U.S. strengths. Lastly, the combination of a state-level comparative advantage index with 
U.S.-level export and import data make the trade exposure measure comparable across states and 
years. 
Higher levels of trade exposure imply that a state has an economy built around goods or 
services for which the U.S. does not have a comparative advantage. This implies that a state’s 
production takes place in competition with net imports of similar goods or services. On the other 
hand, lower levels of trade exposure suggest a state has an economy built around an industry in 
which the U.S. also has a comparative advantage, as suggested by the U.S. being a net exporter 
of that industry’s goods or services.  
Since we are primarily interested in assessing whether states’ global market integration 
attenuates the relationship between state voter ideology and state spending, we also include the 
multiplicative term of the core independent variables to test for any conditional effect. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
Control Variables 
Because the degree of female participation in the work force has been shown to be an 
important predictor of public spending (Huber and Stephens 2001) we include the percentage of 
female adults in the labor force. We include a measure of the age of the state population because 
public spending in the United States is particularly geared towards older adults and children 
(Busemeyer 2007; Lynch 2006).  Using data from the US Census we include the percentage of 
the state population that is over 65 and under 18 years old.9 
Gilens (1996) argues that white Americans perceive that African Americans 
disproportionately benefit from social programs, which depresses support for activist 
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government. State-level studies have demonstrated a similar effect, such that states with large 
black minority populations have lower levels of welfare spending or less generous welfare 
policies (Brown 1995; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss, et al. 2001; Hero and Preuhs 2007). 
Accordingly, we include a control for the percentage of the state population that is African 
American. 
 Vulnerable groups such as the unemployed have been shown to be supporters of 
government spending as well as directly increase the costs of social programs (Lowery and Berry 
1983; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985). Therefore, we include the percentage of the unemployed as a 
control variable. 
 Following classic accounts such as Wagner (1877; see also Lowery and Berry, 
1983), state economic affluence explains government spending, in that high income states have 
the capacity to spend more.  We include state-level real per capita income as well as the growth 
rate of state-level real per capita income as controls, following earlier work by Burgoon (2001) 
and Rudra and Haggard (2005). Data on state-level real per capita income and real per capita 
income growth are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 The power resources theory suggests that governments controlled by left parties 
will spend more on state programs (Huber and Stephens 2001; Moller, et al. 2003; Huber, et al. 
2006; Kelly and Witko 2012). Party competition encourages political parties to compete with one 
another for the broadest range of the electorate, motivating them to spend more on social 
programs (Dawson and Robinson 1963).Therefore, we include state government partisan control 
and party competition in our model. Partisan control is an index of the party that controls the 
state senate, house and governorship. It ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating all three branches 
controlled by the Democratic Party and 3 indicating all three branches controlled by the 
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Republican Party. Party competition is a folded Ranney index measuring state-level competition 
between the two parties (Ranney 1976). 
 Lastly, considering that the manufacturing industry is the most vulnerable to 
globalization and that it comprises the largest trade sector, we include % of manufacturing 
industry as the total size of the economy as a control (Bernard and Jensen 1995). Since the trade 
exposure measure has already taken into consideration the size of manufacturing, we exclude this 
control variable from the trade exposure models. Data on state-level manufacturing are collected 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Findings 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the pooled cross sectional and time series (CSTS) 
models for per capita government spending. The overall state public expenditure models are 
presented in Table 2 and expenditures on welfare are presented in Table 3.  We use the two 
approaches detailed above to consider a state's degree of global market integration.  The first 
approach focuses on the size of the state's exporting economy (trade dependence) whereas the 
second considers the positioning or comparative global advantage or disadvantage of that state's 
economy (trade exposure).  Due to their empirical and theoretical overlap we test the moderating 
effects of trade exposure and trade dependence on the opinion-policy connection separately to 
avoid the inflation of standard errors.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
Total Expenditures 
We begin in Models (1) and (2) by excluding any interaction term from the model to 
demonstrate that we are working with data that replicate the standard finding in the literature; 
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these results show that after controlling for a variety of other structural factors, states with more 
liberal state populations tend to have higher levels of total public expenditures.  This independent 
connection between state liberalism and state public expenditures is displayed graphically in 
Figure 1 and is conventionally seen as evidence of opinion-policy congruence.10  We repeat this 
same replication approach in models (1) and (2) of Table 2; in each case, opinion liberalism has 
an independent effect on state spending, demonstrating that this connection is robust even with 
alternative dependent variables and changes to the model specification. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE] 
Next, we turn to Table 2, Model (3), which builds upon the baseline model by adding the 
interaction term between the trade exposure measure and the opinion liberalism measure.  The 
interaction term reaches conventional thresholds for statistical significance suggesting that trade 
exposure indeed moderates the relationship between opinion liberalism and the relative degree of 
overall public expenditures in the American states. The interaction term makes straightforward 
interpretation of the coefficients challenging from the tables alone.  Therefore, we use the Clarify 
program to graph the relationship between opinion and state spending for low and high trade 
exposure states, where high and low are defined as plus or minus one standard deviation from the 
mean exposure (King, et al. 2000). 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE] 
The key hypothesis test assesses whether higher levels of trade exposure attenuates the 
overall positive opinion-policy connection.  Policy convergence theory expects that the 
ideological desires of citizens will be less important as states become more exposed to global 
markets. In other words, citizen ideology should have lower correspondence with public 
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expenditures in highly exposed states.  The room to maneuver hypothesis diverges from this 
expectations, as it suggests that state governments have the ability to adopt different degrees of 
state spending to confront the pressures of high global exposure; and because states have various 
options, the state spending approaches will reflect the ideological orientation of the citizenry.  As 
can be seen from Figure 2, the association between citizen opinion and the states’ degree of 
public spending is not weaker in states with high trade exposure. When states are exposed to low 
levels of globalization, moving from a low degree to a high degree of liberalism does not 
significantly alter the degree of overall state spending. However, when states face high trade 
exposure, moving from a low degree to a high degree of liberalism increases total state per capita 
spending by about 20%. The marginal effect of citizen opinion, indicated by the slope of the 
predicted lines, is higher in states with high trade exposure compared to states with low trade 
exposure. This finding that opinion and public spending is more congruent in highly exposed 
states diverges sharply from the expectations of convergence theory and aligns well with the 
room to maneuver perspective. 
Next, we turn to model (4), which adds the interaction term between the trade 
dependence measure and the opinion liberalism measure.  The interaction term reaches a 
standard threshold (P<.05) for statistical significance indicating that we can have some 
confidence that trade dependence moderates the relationship between opinion liberalism and the 
relative degree of overall public expenditures in the American states.  To clarify the 
understanding of the interaction term we again graph a figure that displays the relationship 
between opinion and state spending; in Figure 3, we plot the predicted overall state government 
spending based on citizen opinion liberalism for low and high trade dependence states by using 
the Clarify program (King, et al. 2000). The pattern is familiar. The relationship between opinion 
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liberalism and overall state spending, indicated by the slope of the predicted line, is stronger in 
high trade dependent states compared to low trade dependent states.  Because there is no 
attenuation of opinion’s marginal effect on spending in highly dependent states relative to low 
dependent states, the convergence theory is again unsupported, even when considering this 
alternative measure of states’ integration to the global marketplace.  Indeed, the results again 
suggest that global pressures increase the correspondence between citizen opinion and policy.  
This suggests that states react to global market pressures in a way consistent with the ideological 
predispositions of their citizens. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE] 
Welfare Expenditures 
Because states have great leeway to make targeted and diverse policy innovations to 
address similar state challenges, it is often difficult to fully standardize states’ relative 
commitment to addressing specific issues by measuring spending on a particular program.  This 
explains why many past studies use total expenditures (Radcliff and Saiz 1998) or a large basket 
of diverse state policies (Wright, et al. 1987) to measure the degree of state policy liberalism.  
However, the policy convergence literature has had a special emphasis on welfare state 
convergence, as social safety net spending is seen as the most inefficient spending (Swank 2005; 
Adsera and Boix 2002).  It may be that when welfare spending is considered, rather than overall 
state spending, the attenuation effect predicted by the policy convergence theory will emerge; we 
may see the marginal effect of opinion on spending reduced in high trade environments relative 
to low trade environments. To test this we run the same sequence of models but change the 
dependent variable to per capita state spending on welfare.11 These results are presented in Table 
3. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE] 
The first welfare spending hypothesis test is shown in Model (3) of Table 3. The 
interaction term of trade exposure and state opinion liberalism reaches a standard threshold for 
statistical significance, which suggests that trade exposure conditions the relationship between 
opinion liberalism and welfare spending.  Again, to better understand the results we graphically 
display the slope of opinion liberalism for low and high level trade exposure states by using the 
Clarify program (see Figure 4).  Consistent with the results from the previous models, Figure 4 
shows that the strength of the citizen opinion-welfare spending relationship, as indicated by the 
slope, is somewhat steeper for high exposure states compared to low exposure states.  This again 
differs from the convergence theory expectation that citizen opinion will become disconnected 
from policy in states that are highly exposed to global markets.  Once more, these results support 
the expectations of the room to maneuver hypothesis, which predicts no attenuation of the citizen 
opinion-policy connection when states are highly exposed to global markets.   
Finally, we turn to model (4) of Table 3, which again uses welfare expenditures as the 
dependent variable but uses the trade dependence measure to capture states’ global market 
integration.  The interaction term of trade dependence and citizen liberalism is not statistically 
significant.  Figure 5 shows that the independent association of citizen liberalism and welfare 
expenditures is comparable across states with high and low trade dependence (the association is 
slightly stronger in high dependence environments).  Because the link between citizen opinion 
liberalism and state welfare spending is very similar at high and low levels of trade dependence, 
the evidence again conforms to the room to maneuver hypothesis.  This is the key finding for 
testing the hypotheses -the relationship between opinion and spending is not lower in high trade 
states relative to low trade states. 
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Discussion 
Because of the implications for the quality of democracy, a large body of work assesses 
the linkage between public opinion and public policy.  Generally the correspondence between 
opinion and policy has been robust, but in recent years several studies have sought to identify 
factors that weaken or strengthen the opinion-policy connection.  Burstein has even challenged 
researchers to more deeply study how various contextual factors promote or attenuate the 
opinion-policy connection (see Burstein 2010).  This paper follows this conditional perspective 
by connecting well-known economic globalization theories to the opinion-policy congruence 
literature.  Drawing upon competing theories of economic globalization, we leverage the special 
characteristics of the American states, such as the availability of over-time opinion data, a wide 
range of citizen ideology, the state economies’ large differences in the degree of global market 
integration, and state governments’ substantial control over public spending, to explicitly assess 
whether global market integration conditions the ties between citizen opinion and certain public 
policies. 
Our results suggest that the degree of global market integration does moderate the 
relationship between public opinion and state spending.  Yet, the specific nature of this 
moderation casts doubt on the well-known policy convergence thesis.  Under conditions of high 
economic globalization, rather than public opinion becoming less relevant as a determinant of 
fundamental public spending policies, thereby flattening the opinion-policy linkage as the 
convergence thesis implies, higher trade seems to often strengthen the positive association 
between opinion and policy in the American states.  This empirical pattern fits with the room to 
maneuver perspective that suggests states have various options when selecting the suitable 
solutions to the anxieties and challenges associated with economies that are highly exposed to 
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international pressures.  In highly globalized state economies, our results suggest that a liberal 
citizenry will be especially likely to see their state increases public expenditures.  But when 
citizens hold conservative views their argument for a neo-liberal policy path of low public 
spending is particularly likely to manifest in state policy.  Because both the policy convergence 
and room to maneuver perspectives argue that state spending becomes more salient in a highly 
globalized context, one way to comprehend these results is to view the findings through the lens 
of past studies that show that the opinion-policy linkage is strongest when policies are highly 
salient (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012). 
Despite much of the theorizing about economic globalization deeply conditioning state 
sovereignty and the associated implications for democratic responsiveness, the cross-national 
globalization literature has paid "little attention to mass politics” (Hellwig 2007, 772).  Part of 
the explanation for the lack of attention to citizen opinions in this literature probably stems from 
the scarcity of multi-decade, cross-nationally comparable opinion data.  Fortunately, the U.S. 
states have long been used to consider the opinion-policy linkage. But even with the growth of 
U.S. global trade over time, and the appreciation that the fiscally decentralized American states 
should be especially sensitive to global market pressures (Piven 2001; Weingast 1995), to date 
no empirical studies at the U.S. sub-national level explore the potential effect of global market 
integration on the connection between opinion and public policies.  As such, our paper 
contributes in multiple ways.  It offers one of the only tests of well-known competing views of 
economic globalization as it relates to the connection between mass attitudes and public policy 
and it shows that global market integration should be considered a potential (even likely) 
moderator of the opinion policy linkage in the American states.  
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Finally, this paper contributes to the unresolved debate about whether the public opinion-
policy linkage has increased or decreased in the United States over the past several decades (for a 
review of the debate see Burstein 2003; 2010).  If the public opinion-policy linkage indeed has 
decreased, at first glance then it seems plausible that economic globalization has played a role. 
The time period considered in this debate corresponds closely with the large relative increase in 
U.S. global trade, with global trade nearly tripling over the past 30 years (Owen and Quinn 2014).  
And certainly the most prominent theories of economic globalization explicitly suggest that the 
power of the public over policy will be directly affected by increasing international market 
involvement and competition.  Our initial results suggest that across the American states, high 
levels of global market integration correspond with somewhat stronger links between public 
opinion and public policy.  Accordingly, our results suggest that the increase in international 
market exposure is not a likely culprit of a decline in the public opinion-policy linkage over time 
in the U.S.  Instead, it actually may be a countervailing force against the general tide of opinion-
policy attenuation.   
Perhaps more than anything else, our results from a diversity of models can be seen as 
consistent evidence against the opinion-policy attenuation effect predicted by the policy 
convergence thesis.  Still, because our work represents a preliminary exploration of economic 
globalization and the opinion-policy linkage in the American states, and because some of our 
results and robustness checks show no conditioning (neither strengthening nor weakening of the 
opinion-policy link), our results about the link between opinion and policy in highly globalized 
states should be viewed with some caution.  In particular, poor measurement of the key variables, 
particularly the globalization measures, could be the source of the null or significant conditional 
results.  Noisy measures inflate standard errors and often lead to null results; biased measures, 
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and other data and modeling imperfections, could produce false positive findings. Critically then, 
more work, with different modeling approaches, data, and assumptions are needed to better 
understand why the connection between opinion and policy appears to be equal or somewhat 
stronger in highly globalized states. Given the overall paucity of research in this specific area, we 
hope our work encourages new research exploring global market exposure and the opinion-
policy linkage in the American states. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Core Variables. (U.S. States, 1987-2006) 
VARIABLES Mean St. Dev. 
   Total State Expenditures (per capita) 3,558.3  1,513.8  
   State Welfare Expenditures (per capita) 721.4 369.5 
   Liberalism 20.5 3.3 
   Trade Exposure 7.5 2.4 
   Trade Dependence* 5.6 3.3 
   Liberalism x Trade Exposure 155.0 55.6 
   Liberalism x Trade Dependence* 116.8 77.7 
   % Unemployment 5.3 1.4 
   % Black 10.1 9.4 
   Real Per Capita Income (thousands) 32.3 4.0 
   % Real Per Capita Income Growth 1.4 2.0 
   Dependency Ratio 0.62 0.05 
   % Female Labor Force Partic. Rate 60.0 4.5 
   Partisan Control 1.4 1.0 
   
Party Competition .63 .1 
   
% Manufacturing Output 15.0 6.3 
   Observations 966 
Number of states 50 
*One state is missing for the trade dependence data. 
All other statistics are from all 50 states. 
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Table 2: Total State Expenditures in U.S. States, 1987-2006 
  Per Capita Total State Expenditures 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Liberalism 21.82*** 17.41*** -48.73*** -5.74 
 
(6.34) (6.39) (13.04) (8.91) 
Trade Exposure -20.45* 
 
-174.72*** 
 
 
(11.14) 
 
(29.21) 
 Trade Dependence 
 
-7.73 
 
-98.28*** 
  
(10.17) 
 
(37.25) 
Liberalism x Trade Exposure 
  
8.71*** 
 
   
(1.54) 
 Liberalism x Trade Dependence 
   
4.04** 
    
(1.59) 
% Unemployment 26.67** 18.48* 37.95*** 20.05* 
 
(11.05) (10.92) (11.62) (10.95) 
% Black 26.38 17.98 32.37 6.55 
 
(30.03) (29.11) (30.09) (29.65) 
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 29.02** 21.88 30.62** 21.63 
 
(13.96) (14.63) (13.83) (14.52) 
Real Per Capita Income 1.11 -0.06 5.14 0.53 
 
(8.91) (9.04) (8.91) (9.08) 
Dependency Ratio -1,703.81*** -757.17* -2,231.48*** -625.69 
 
(455.12) (425.09) (446.80) (420.60) 
Female Labor Force Partic. Rate 12.85* 5.36 11.01 6.16 
 
(7.02) (6.71) (7.04) (6.59) 
Partisan Control -22.84* -25.71* -13.43 -16.98 
 
(13.60) (13.56) (13.58) (13.38) 
Party Competition 481.86*** 532.50*** 329.60* 466.25** 
 
(186.01) (185.70) (188.42) (182.85) 
% Manufacturing Output 
 
-10.63* 
 
-11.46* 
  
(9.36) 
 
(8.92) 
Year Fixed Effects (included) (included) (included) (included) 
State Fixed Effects (included) (included) (included) (included) 
Constant 559.17 812.29 2,116.69*** 1,349.08** 
 
(654.84) (623.39) (673.45) (638.59) 
     Observations 966 946 966 946 
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Number of state 49 48 49 48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: State Welfare Expenditures in U.S. States, 1987-2006 
  State Welfare Spending (per capita) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Liberalism 7.67*** 6.13** -10.15** 2.41 
 
(2.54) (2.58) (4.82) (3.90) 
Trade Exposure -9.50* 
 
-48.45*** 
 
 
(4.86) 
 
(12.32) 
 Trade Dependence 
 
10.33*** 
 
-4.20 
  
(3.20) 
 
(13.94) 
Liberalism x Trade Exposure 
  
2.20*** 
 
   
(0.61) 
 Liberalism x Trade Dependence 
   
0.65 
    
(0.59) 
% Unemployment 18.49*** 11.68*** 21.34*** 11.93*** 
 
(4.32) (4.35) (4.38) (4.32) 
% Black 18.30* 25.60** 19.81* 23.76** 
 
(10.66) (10.75) (10.57) (10.83) 
Real Per Capita GDP Growth -4.10 -6.55 -3.69 -6.59 
 
(4.28) (4.36) (4.30) (4.35) 
Real Per Capita Income 3.61 3.70 4.63* 3.79 
 
(2.48) (2.50) (2.52) (2.50) 
Dependency Ratio -539.07*** -337.30* -672.32*** -316.20* 
 
(181.55) (174.28) (182.64) (173.70) 
Female Labor Force Partic. Rate 10.30*** 8.14*** 9.83*** 8.27*** 
 
(2.72) (2.53) (2.72) (2.53) 
Partisan Control -3.04 -5.61 -0.67 -4.20 
 
(5.08) (5.13) (5.13) (5.19) 
Party Competition -99.75 -51.70 -138.19** -62.34 
 
(65.70) (64.55) (64.70) (65.59) 
% Manufacturing Output 
 
-9.22*** 
 
-9.35*** 
  
(2.02) 
 
(2.03) 
Year Fixed Effects (included) (included) (included) (included) 
State Fixed Effects (included) (included) (included) (included) 
Constant -133.12 -68.44 260.19 17.70 
 
(264.31) (261.28) (275.34) (271.75) 
     Observations 966 946 966 946 
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Number of state 49 48 49 48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Predicted Total State Expenditures as Liberalism Varies 
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Figure 2: Total State Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Exposure 
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Figure 3: Total State Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Dependence 
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Figure 4: State Welfare Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Exposure 
 
 
  
32 
 
Figure 5: State Welfare Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Dependence 
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Appendix 1: Construction of Trade Exposure Index 
In this section we outline the construction of trade exposure, which differs from trade 
dependence in that it is a measure of global market positioning rather than the relative size of a 
state’s international trading economy. We consider two components for the measure: (1) a state’s 
comparative advantage in the production of a particular good or service, and (2) where those 
particular industries fall along the net export – net import spectrum for the U.S. as a whole. We 
discuss each in turn. 
 Balassa (1965) laid the foundation for measuring revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
index. For country A and any good i, the standard Balassa RCA index is simply good i’s share of 
total exports in country A relative to good i’s share of world exports. For example, if i exports 
coming from country A were 30% of all of country A’s exports but i exports from the world 
were only 15% of total world exports, then country A has an RCA index of 2 in the production of 
good i. And because it is greater than one, country A is said to have a revealed comparative 
advantage in good i. One limiting characteristic of the RCA index is that it is limited to a 
particular good, service, or industry. To resolve this issue, we consider three industries (i.e. 
services, agriculture, and manufacturing) instead of trade in a single industry. A second 
constraint is that disaggregated U.S. state-level international export data by industries is limited, 
especially in the years before 2000. Therefore we use employment in a given industry in lieu of 
exports to compose an adjusted Balassa RCA index and use it as the first component of our index. 
We construct the following adjusted RCA measure for each state s, at time t, and where US is the 
aggregate United States data, and Emp is employment: 
adj. RCA  =   
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 The second component of our index is the nature of the industry or the goods and services 
being traded. Our goal here is to identify how the goods and services that states export abroad 
map onto the United State’s net export – net import continuum. Do states specialize in goods that 
compete with foreign imports or do they specialize in industries that the US itself has a revealed 
comparative advantage in? For this component we construct an adjusted Grubel-Lloyd (GL) 
index of intra-industry trade as shown below (Grubel and Lloyd 1971; 1975). Different from the  
original GL index that uses absolute value of net exports, we use the real value of net exports  
since we are interested in mapping industries into the entire net export – net import spectrum.  
Our adjusted GL index ranges from -1 to 1, with 1 meaning there are only exports and no 
imports of industry i-related goods or services in the U.S., and -1 meaning there are only imports 
and no exports of industry i-related goods in the U.S.. 
adj. GL  =   
By combining the two components, we create a measure of trade exposure, which is an 
index of states’ comparative advantage in particular industries weighted by an industry’s position 
on the U.S. net exports – net import spectrum. Multiplying the two components together allows 
comparison across states and years. 
Trade Exposureit     
 The first component in parenthesis is the adjusted RCA index and the second is the 
adjusted GL index. We also take the negative so that higher levels of trade exposure imply that a 
state has a comparative advantage in goods or services for which the U.S. does not have a 
comparative advantage in. This implies that a state’s production takes place alongside U.S. net 
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imports of similar goods or services. On the other end, lower levels of trade exposure suggest a 
state has a comparative advantage in an industry in which the U.S. also has a comparative 
advantage in as suggested by the U.S. being a net exporter of that industry’s goods or services.  
The employment data for the American states come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts, while the U.S. export data come from the World Trade 
Organization’s Statistics Database. Industry-level data spans the SIC and NAICS era 
classification systems. In order to make the two systems speak to each other, we converted the 
SIC data to 2-digit NAICS when possible, and also used only finance, insurance, and real estate 
as a proxy for services. In its raw form, trade exposure centers on zero. For our data, the mean is 
-.08, the minimum is -.8, the maximum is .5, and has a standard deviation of .21. For more 
intuitive presentation in the figures of the main text, we rescaled the measure to be from 0-13, 
and with a mean of 7.5 and a standard deviation of 2.5. 
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Appendix 2: Robustness to Alternative Specification Using an Error Correction Model 
Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry (1993) recommend the error correction model (ECM) 
for non-stationary and co-integrated time series data. Following their advice, we conduct various 
tests on stationarity and cointegration of our panel data. The panel unit root analyses of our 
dependent variables show that our dependent variables (i.e., total spending and welfare spending) 
are both non-stationary, and the Westerlund tests detect cointegration between the core 
independent variables and both dependent variables (Dickey and Fuller 1979; Phillips and Perron 
1988; Westerlund 2007; Persyn and Westerlund 2008). Thus, we deem the error correction 
model as another possible appropriate modeling strategy for our CSTS data. In an ECM, the 
first-difference of the dependent variable is estimated as an equation of the lagged dependent 
variable, the first difference and the lagged independent variables, which we specify as:  
∆𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝛽2Δ𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑖 
where Δ represents the annual change, Y is total state expenditures per capita or state welfare 
expenditures per capita for state i in year t, X is a vector of independent variables, and e is the 
error term. The results of our error correction models are presented in the table below, and we 
also use Clarify coupled with Stata 12.0 to draw the following figures to graphically demonstrate 
the interactive effects of globalization (i.e., trade exposure and trade dependence) and citizen 
liberalism on spending (King, et al. 2000). While facing higher levels of economic globalization, 
the association between liberalism and spending, as indicated by the slope of the predicted lines, 
either stays the same or increases slightly. The bottom line is that even when we use a more 
stringent modeling strategy, we still find that the congruence of opinion and policy does not 
attenuate when states face a more globalized environment.  
Table A1:  State Government Total and Welfare Spending in Error Correction Models 
  Total Spending   Welfare Spending 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2)   Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
 Coeff. (SE)  Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE)  Coeff. (SE) 
Dependent Variable t-1 .014 (.03) 
 
.017 (.02) 
 
-.00 (.02) 
 
.013 (.02) 
Δ Liberalism -2.23 (6.17) 
 
-2.56 (6.57) 
 
-.24 (2.39) 
 
.16 (2.57) 
Liberalism t-1 10.26 (8.48) 
 
2.86 (4.43) 
 
.92 (3.42) 
 
.03 (2.16) 
Δ Trade Exposure 2.22 (17.38) 
    
8.99+ (5.29) 
   Trade Exposure t-1 11.75 (19.33) 
    
-1.17 (8.08) 
   Δ Liberalism × Δ Trade Exposure -6.87 (5.14) 
    
-2.21 (2.36) 
   Liberalism t-1× Trade Exposure t-1 -.24 (1.00) 
    
.25 (.41) 
   Δ Trade Dependence 
   
3.39 (11.65) 
    
2.76 (3.39) 
Trade Dependence t-1 
   
-19.93 (16.62) 
    
-10.11+ (5.93) 
Δ Liberalism × Δ Trade Dependence 
  
-1.11 (5.38) 
    
.67 (1.70) 
Liberalism t-1× Trade Dependence t-1 
   
.97 (.71) 
    
.42+ (.25) 
            Δ % Unemployment 22.05 (16.06) 
 
21.53 (17.21) 
 
13.78* (5.51) 
 
13.92* (5.74) 
%Unemployment t-1 -18.17 (12.19) 
 
-20.53 (14.58) 
 
4.43 (3.43) 
 
4.05 (4.13) 
Δ % black -.46 (68.55) 
 
-6.29 (71.62) 
 
17.17 (20.79) 
 
16.02 (21.80) 
% black t-1 .32 (1.14) 
 
.78 (1.02) 
 
-.06 (.30) 
 
.15 (.30) 
Δ Real per capita income -23.87 (92.61) 
 
-19.12 (91.80) 
 
62.11* (31.08) 
 
47.83 (32.18) 
Real per capita income t-1 .20 (3.25) 
 
1.11 (3.58) 
 
-.85 (1.32) 
 
-.08 (1.50) 
Δ Per capita growth 12.01 (28.92) 
 
9.23 (28.44) 
 
-21.84* (10.03) 
 
-17.63+ (10.29) 
Per capita growth t-1 16.85 (31.98) 
 
13.41 (31.09) 
 
-25.23* (10.68) 
 
-20.234+ (10.95) 
Δ Dependency Ratio 277.17 (869.66) 
 
288.17 (965.97) 
 
-3.44 (280.31) 
 
-202.68 (329.39) 
 Dependency Ratio t-1 147.33 (150.67) 
 
32.98 (192.17) 
 
76.86 (54.88) 
 
34.21 (62.39) 
Δ Female labor force participation -13.52+ (7.05) 
 
-15.08* (7.64) 
 
-4.46* (2.15) 
 
-5.37* (2.24) 
 Female labor force participation t-1 -1.90 (3.53) 
 
-3.16 (4.03) 
 
.52 (.74) 
 
.33 (.84) 
Δ State Government Partisan Control -10.74 (13.90) -11.39 (13.83) -5.41 (5.54) -4.84 (5.80) 
 State Government Partisan Control t-1 -8.42 (9.19)  -4.57 (9.19)  -4.67 (3.05)  -2.95 (3.11) 
Δ Party Competition 136.01 (286.72)  179.33 (288.57)  46.99 (93.39)  50.73 (95.25) 
 Party Competition t-1 16.76 (67.52)  40.54 (68.81)  19.66 (37.24)  22.53 (39.21) 
Δ % Manufacturing    2.11 (7.16)     .40 (3.08) 
%Manufacturing t-1 
   
.36 (1.43) 
    
.11 (.47) 
Constant -24.70 (364.06)  269.33 (431.10)  -69.04 (117.30)  1.74 (91.79) 
N 917 
 
898 
 
934 
 
898 
R-Square .0698 
 
.0647 
 
.1042 
 
.0973 
Wald Chi-Square 62.35 
 
55.48 
 
50.39 
 
44.01 
Significance levels: +  0.10 level, * 0.05 level,  ** 0.01 level,  *** 0.001 level 
      
Figure A1: Predicted value of change in total spending as liberalism varies from minimum to maximum values 
under high and low levels of trade exposure or trade dependence. 
  
 
Figure A2: Predicted value of change in welfare spending as liberalism varies from minimum to maximum 
values under high and low levels of trade vulnerability or exposure. 
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Endnotes 
                                                             
1 Author names are listed in alphabetical order.  
 
2 Whereas early research using demographic proxies for opinion data found little connection between opinion and public 
policy (e.g. Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969), the vast majority of scholarship over the past few decades points to a robust 
connection (Burstein, 2010; 2003).   This linkage has been considered over both the long and short term, with Wright, 
Erikson, and McIver’s (1985; 1987; 1993) path breaking work notably showing that the most liberal polities tend to have 
the most liberal policies and with others (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995; Page & Shapiro 1983) showing that short 
term opinion shifts precede congruent policy changes.  Not only temporally robust, the opinion-policy linkage generally 
holds across diverse measurement decisions, with indicators of specific and general political opinions and variously 
conceived policy outcomes generally confirming the linkage (e.g. Brace, et al. 2002).  Although this literature focuses on 
the United States, and particularly the American states, recent scholarship employing cross-national data also supports the 
view that voters’ political preferences tend to map with policy outcomes in developed democracies (Brooks and Manza 
2006a; 2006b). 
 
3 As importantly, states have a wide range of citizen ideologies and largely control the nature of state policy and public 
spending (Garand, 1985; Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Kelly & Witko, 2012). 
 
4 This can be seen as an extension of typical race-to-the-bottom theory of market preserving federalism that suggests that 
many U.S. or foreign firms will move to the American states with the lowest wages, taxes, and regulations, thus 
pressuring state spending downward through inter-state competition (Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995; Volden 2002). Global 
competition, compared to state-to-state competition, is special only as a matter of degree.  But the difference in degree is 
significant, as the variance between U.S. states’ environmental, tax, and wage conditions and developing countries’ 
conditions is dramatically wider than the variance between U.S states. 
 
5 As Mosely plainly reviews this perspective, “[g]overnments must sell their policy not only to voters, but also to 
international investors” (2000, 357). 
 
6 Readers should consider the possibility that a null interaction term (public opinion * globalization) stems from poor 
measurement rather than the mechanisms outlined in the RTM theory, given that noisy measures inflate standard errors 
and often lead to null results. 
 
7 As a robustness check, we use % overall state expenditure/gross state product and % state welfare expenditure/gross 
state product and the logarithm of spending as alternative dependent variables. Additionally, we use the State and Local 
Government Finance Report of the U.S. Census to combine state and local government total spending and state and local 
welfare spending. The implications for the hypotheses are very similar to the results presented in this paper and support 
the same key conclusions of no significant attenuation of the opinion-policy connection in highly globalized states. 
  
8 For our general liberal opinion measure we largely follow Stimson, MacKuen, Erikson (1994). “These real preferences, 
what we have called ‘policy mood,’ (Stimson 1991) are standing predispositions toward the role of government.  Global 
public opinion is at the highly generalized level at which we believe typical citizens – not C-SPAN junkies- approach 
government.” (30)….”much of public opinion in American politics can be understood as generalized views toward 
government itself.” (31). And as Manza and Cook point out, the focus on general policy mood avoids the low policy 
information on the part of the public (2002: 637). 
 
9 As a robustness check, we replace our dependency ratio with % older population (over 65 years old) and % young 
population (under 18 years old), individually, and the models show very similar results. 
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10 We used the Clarify program in Stata 12.0 to graph all our figures (King, et al. 2000).  
 
11 We also ran a series of models using TANF cash benefits for a family of three as the dependent variable.  This variable 
has two notable problems, however, which relegates its use to a robustness check rather than as a core part of the analysis. 
Welfare generosity data are available for only about half the time series and this measure often does not vary much within 
the same state for many years at a time.  Nonetheless, across the models, in no case is the interaction term statistically 
significant; again, the opinion liberalism – public policy linkage is not weaker in states with high levels of global trade.   
